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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, corporate failures of all sorts have 
flooded this country.  Because directors are supposed to manage 
the affairs of the corporation, to what extent are they responsible 
for these failures?  If corporate disasters result from ineffective 
management by boards of directors, when might members of a 
board bear personal liability for losses caused to shareholders and 
the company?  Although directors must have played substantial 
roles in these catastrophes, they have faced relatively little finger-
pointing.  Do boards of directors have any significant accountability 
anymore for how they manage a corporation? 
A case in point is the local, but nationally very large, 
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. (UHG).  Backdated stock options were 
allegedly granted to UHG’s former chief executive officer, former 
general counsel, and its many other officers and employees.1  Thus, 
the following lawsuits were brought against these parties and, in 
some cases, the company itself.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission brought civil actions against the CEO, the general 
counsel, and UHG.2
 
 1. Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 
2006, at A1 (reporting options granted to members of the board of directors were 
apparently not backdated). 
  A class action suit for violation of the federal 
 2. Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. McGuire, (No. 06CV01216), 631 F. 
Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2007), 2007 WL 4298731 [hereinafter SEC 
Complaint].  
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securities laws was brought in federal district court.3  A derivative 
action was brought in federal district court4 and another derivative 
action was brought in Minnesota state court.5
The CEO and general counsel faced injunctions and severe 
penalties imposed by the SEC, and while UHG neither admitted 
nor denied the SEC’s allegations, the court enjoined the company 
from further specified violations of the federal securities laws.
 
6  
Pursuant to a preliminarily approved settlement of the class action 
suit, UHG paid $895 million into a settlement fund for the benefit 
of class members given the alleged federal securities law violations.7  
Recently, the state and federal plaintiffs’ counsel sought a 
combined attorneys’ fee award of $64 million, which UHG 
contested.8
A proposed settlement of both federal and state derivative suits 
was reached by a special litigation committee (SLC) with the 
former CEO, the former general counsel, and a former member of 
the board.
  
9
 
 3. Consolidated Complaint, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., 
No. 0:06-cv-01691-JMR-FLN, 
  Subject to the individual settlement agreements, the 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 94344 (D. Minn. Dec. 8, 2006), 
2006 WL 3716007  [hereinafter Class Action Complaint], (referring to 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10(b)(5) (2006)); see also STANFORD LAW SCHOOL IN COOPERATION WITH 
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, COMPANY AND CASE 
INFORMATION, UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., available at http://securities.stanford
.edu/1036/UNH_01/ [hereinafter STANFORD REPORT]. 
 4. See, e.g., Lead Plaintiffs’ Amended and Consolidated Verified Derivative 
and Class Action Complaint, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative 
Litig., No. 06-1216 JMR/FLN, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Sept. 21, 2006), 2006 
WL 2791649 [hereinafter Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action 
Complaint]. 
 5. Consolidated Derivative Complaint, In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 
Derivative Litig., No. 27-CV-06-8085 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Aug. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.gardylaw.com/docs/155-Complaint%208-14-06.pdf [hereinafter State 
Consolidated Derivative Complaint]. 
 6. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 06-CV-1216 
JMR/FLN, 06-CV-1691 JMR/FLN, 2007 WL 4571127 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007) 
(noting that the civil fine was the “largest ever assessed by the SEC”); In re 
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 548 (Minn. 
2008). 
 7. STANFORD REPORT, supra note 3. 
 8. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Lead Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel’s Fee Applications, In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative 
Litig., Nos. 06-1216 (JMR/FLN), 27 CV 06-8085, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. 
Feb. 4, 2009), 2009 WL 319525. 
 9. See Report of the Special Litigation Committee ¶ 4, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
v. McGuire, No. 06CV01216, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2007), 2007 
WL 4298730  [hereinafter SLC Report] (the former member of the board, 
coincidentally, was also former chairman of the compensation committee). 
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SLC recommended that all claims against all named defendants in 
the derivative actions, including current and former UHG officers 
and directors, should be dismissed.10  The proposed settlement 
agreements received approval by both the state and federal 
courts.11  Although these suits have been settled or remain subject 
to approved settlements, no member of the board of directors, 
other than the former CEO and former general counsel, has 
apparently been found liable.12
The shareholders filed well-pleaded complaints in both the 
federal and state derivative actions.  Furthermore, they filed a well-
pleaded and subsequently class-action-certified complaint, alleging 
that the defendants violated federal securities laws.  The 
defendants even paid $895 million to settle that complaint.
  
13  
Despite these facts, there has been no adjudication in a court of law 
of the UHG board’s responsibility or accountability.  The 
appointment and report of the SLC finessed any such adjudication 
without showing any findings of fact and reasons supporting its 
conclusions.14
To understand how a board-appointed committee can 
convince a court to dismiss and settle a derivative suit without 
showing detailed justification, it is appropriate to review the statutes, 
case law, and theoretical concepts behind derivative suits.  Thus, 
this article first focuses on the current framework under Minnesota 
law governing corporate directors’ duties and responsibilities,
  And so, Minnesota courts effectively disposed of the 
factual allegations in these well-pleaded derivative actions, directed 
at the behavior and actions of certain members of the board, 
without reviewing findings of fact or reasoning behind the SLC’s 
conclusions.  How could this happen?  The story is long, 
complicated, and intriguing. 
15 the 
business judgment rule,16
 
 10. Id. 
 and the shareholders’ opportunity to 
 11. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 631 F. Supp. 2d 
1151, 1151 (D. Minn. 2009); In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative 
Litig., No. 27-CV-06-8085 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. May 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/Public/News/Orders/UnitedHealth_Gro
up_Incorporated_5-14-09.pdf.  
 12. See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV. 
 13. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10Q), at 22 (May 7, 
2009) [hereinafter 10Q Report], available at http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/
invest/2009/UHG_Q1_2009_10-Q_FINAL.pdf .  
 14. See SLC Report, supra note 9. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II.A. 
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bring derivative suits.17  Then, this article analyzes how these 
matters are handled by SLCs.18  In the fourth section, the story 
finally reaches the derivative suit against UHG, where the reader 
will see how it was dismissed and settled with minimal judicial 
review.19  The fifth part analyzes the standard the Minnesota 
Supreme Court adopted for reviewing SLC decisions to dismiss and 
settle derivative suits.20  The sixth and final portion assesses the 
scope of continuing director accountability in Minnesota.21
II. THE CURRENT CORPORATE LIABILITY FRAMEWORK IN 
MINNESOTA 
  
A. Directors’ Duties and Liabilities 
Our story begins with Minnesota Statutes section 302A.201, 
which provides that Minnesota corporations shall be managed “by 
or under the direction of a board.”22  Section 302A.251 continues 
and defines the fiduciary duties of directors: “[a] director shall 
discharge the duties of the position of director in good faith, in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.”23
Those words could lead the reader to assume that a director is 
responsible for negligence in discharging his or her duties.  But in 
Minnesota and across the country, this straightforward reading is 
subject to an important interpretational gloss that covers these 
words.  When a director is sued for his or her allegedly negligent 
conduct, the director will be excused from liability where the 
director made “an informed business decision, in good faith, [and] 
without an abuse of discretion.”
  
24
Significantly, the director receives the benefit of the 
presumption that his or her actions complied with that standard.
  
25
 
 17. See infra Part II.C. 
  
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
 20. See infra Part V. 
 21. See infra Part VI. 
 22. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 23. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 24. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003). 
 25. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 
544, 551 (Minn. 2008).  See also MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2008).  “[T]he board of 
directors is presumed to be disinterested and to have acted on an informed basis, 
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Even if a director makes a decision that subsequently harms the 
corporation, despite the statute’s express language, the director is 
excused from liability provided that the error was made in good 
faith and based on reasonable inquiry.26  This interpretation is 
known as the “business judgment rule.”27  Courts recognize that 
directors manage risk-taking in their everyday decisions.28  
Assuming the decisions are well-informed, courts should not judge 
the decisions, in the light of hindsight, on the basis that directors 
were negligent for assuming a particular risk.29
To defeat this presumption, the plaintiff must plead facts that, 
if true, would show that a director either made a poorly informed 
decision or acted in bad faith, thereby breaching the duty of care 
or the duty of loyalty respectively.
  Simply put, courts 
do not hold directors liable for business decisions just because the 
decisions did not produce the best result for the corporation.  
30
B. Indemnification: Smith v. VanGorkom’s Effect on Director’s 
Accountability   
  Before examining how the 
business judgment rule relates to derivative suits, the reader should 
first understand that settlements, not verdicts, are the most 
common results of director or officer misconduct.  Part of the 
reason for this can be explained by the concepts behind 
indemnification and directors’ and officers’ insurance. 
A director who breaches the duty of care in Minnesota is 
entitled to indemnification in accordance with section 302A.521 of 
 
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the corporation.”  Michael Dooley & Norman Veasey, The Role of the 
Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 
BUS. LAW. 503, 504–05 (1989) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984)).  “Because of this presumption of sound business judgment, the board’s 
decisions ‘will not be disturbed by court if they can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose.’”  Id. at 505 (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 
720 (Del. 1971)). 
 26. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
 27. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS 
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 39 (5th ed. 1998).  
The Minnesota Supreme Court confirmed that section 302A.251 is the codified 
version of Minnesota’s business judgment rule.  In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 
S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn. 2008). 
 28. See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003). 
 29. Dooley, supra note 25, at 519. 
 30. See, e.g., Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 58–59 (Minn. 1982); BLOCK , 
supra note 27, at 27–28. 
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the Minnesota Statutes.31  The same section allows the board to 
advance defense costs subject to board approval and control.32  
Indemnification provides effective protection for a director if the 
board is friendly, if the corporation has the requisite assets to satisfy 
the obligation, and if the director meets the statutory standard.33  
Moreover, as a condition of accepting their appointment to the 
board, many directors request or require that the corporation 
provide Directors and Officers (hereinafter “D&O”) insurance 
coverage.34  These policies, which are frequently written in 
indemnification and not defense coverage format,35 may provide 
insurance coverage to individual directors as well as to the 
corporation itself.36  Thus, short of fraud, bad faith, or certain kinds 
of illegal behavior, a director could reasonably expect to avoid 
personal liability given the availability of indemnification or 
insurance coverage.37
In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Smith v. Van 
  
 
 31. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a)(1)–(5) (2008).  A director could be 
indemnified if he or she: 
(1) has not been indemnified by another organization [for the same 
lawsuit] . . . ; (2) acted in good faith; (3) received no improper personal 
benefit and section 302A.255, if applicable, has been satisfied; (4) in the 
case of a criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the 
conduct was unlawful; and (5) in the case of acts or omissions occurring 
in the official capacity . . . reasonably believed that the conduct was in the 
best interests of the corporation[,] or [for director, officer, employee, or 
agent of the corporation who serves at the request of the corporation for 
another organization,] reasonably believed that the conduct was not 
opposed to the best interests of the corporation.   
Id.  
 32. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 6(a)(1) (2008) (“All determinations 
whether indemnification . . . is required . . . shall be made . . . by the board by a 
majority of a quorum, if the directors who are at the time parties to the 
proceeding are not counted for determining either a majority or the presence of a 
quorum . . . .”). 
 33. As a matter of fact, a corporation needs indemnification to recruit future 
directors; otherwise, no reasonable candidate would agree to serve in a position 
that could expose him or her to liability for losses that range in the millions.  See 2 
DENNIS J. BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT 
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 1853 (5th ed. 1998). 
 34. Id. at 1853–54. 
 35. See David M. Balabanian, Civil RICO Litigation, 313 PLI/LIT 675, 677 
(1986) (“The typical D & O policy is written as an ‘indemnity’ policy, not a 
‘liability’ policy.”).  
 36. Bennett L. Ross, Protecting Corporate Directors and Officers: Insurance and 
Other Alternatives, 40 VAND. L. REV. 775, 783 (1987). 
 37. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a) (2008). 
3. Hogg-Triggs.docx 11/18/2009  1:29 PM 
2009] WELL-PLEAD DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS 77 
Gorkom,38 holding the entire board of directors of the Trans Union 
Corporation liable for gross negligence by reason of not paying 
sufficient attention to a transaction involving the sale of the 
business.39  Insurers writing D&O coverage grew nervous about 
their possible financial exposures.40  As a result, the market for 
obtaining such coverage became thin.41  Some directors in 
Minnesota are said to have resigned shortly after this decision due 
to their concerns about the continuing availability of reasonably 
priced and termed D&O coverage.42
In response, the Delaware Bar promptly stepped up to the 
plate.  It drafted and then negotiated through the Delaware 
Legislature a statutory amendment authorizing shareholders to 
amend corporate articles of incorporation so as to immunize 
directors from liability for negligent performance of their duties as 
members of the board.
  
43  The Minnesota Legislature, at the urging 
of the corporate bar, promptly copied that statute into Minnesota 
law.44
 
 38. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
  Many Minnesota corporations then obtained favorable 
shareholder votes amending articles so as to provide the 
 39. See id. at 864.  Very recently, this case was overruled by the Delaware 
Supreme Court decision, Gantler v. Stephens, but for different reasons.  Gantler v. 
Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009).  Van Gorkom held that shareholder 
ratification of a director’s decision extinguished the shareholder claim completely.  
488 A.2d at 889–90.  Now, that is not necessarily the case; the challenged director 
decision remains subject to the business judgment rule (unless the claim asserted 
lack of authority).  Gantler, 965 A.2d at 713.  
 40. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability 
Insurance?, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 24–25 (1989). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Laurie Baum with John A. Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, BUS. WK., Sept. 
8, 1986, at 56.  
 43. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986).  “Section 102(b)(7) was 
signed into law on June 18, 1986 and became effective July 1, 1986.”  Ronald E. 
Mallen & David W. Evans, Surviving the Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Crisis: 
Insurance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 439, 472 n.92 (1987).  There were 
however, restrictions on the indemnification provided:  
[S]uch provision shall not eliminate or limit the liability of a director: (i) 
for any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its 
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve 
intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of 
this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an 
improper personal benefit.  No such provision shall eliminate or limit the 
liability of a director for any act or omission occurring prior to the date 
when such provision becomes effective. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1986). 
 44. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a)(1)–(5) (1986).   
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appropriate immunization for negligence (but not breach of duty 
of loyalty, bad faith, or illegal misconduct) by directors.45
In Minnesota, a finding of breach of duty of loyalty, bad faith, 
or illegal misconduct generally requires either an admission, a 
determination by a disinterested board, or an adjudication of such 
a finding.  Absent an admission or finding of such liability, 
indemnification is mandatory.
 
46  Consequently, settlement of a 
lawsuit, rather than adjudication, makes it likely that a director will 
qualify for indemnification or insurance coverage or both.47  
Except as covered by insurance, the liability for the loss is then 
shifted from the director to the corporation and thus to the 
shareholders generally.48
Plaintiffs in both derivative and securities law violation cases 
often settle rather than litigate to adjudication for various reasons, 
one being that adjudicated violations of the federal securities laws 
are neither indemnifiable nor generally insurable.
  
49  Thus, a 
plaintiff who pursues the case to final judicial determination runs 
the risk of recovering only from the pocket of the defendant rather 
than the presumptively much more ample pocket of the company 
or the insurer.50
Additionally, settlements are often attractive to plaintiffs faced 
with problems of proof, such as the requisite scienter under Rule 
10b-5.
  
51
 
 45. See, e.g., Third Restated Articles of Incorporation of UnitedHealth Group 
Incorporated, Section 7(a), available at http://unitedhealthgroup.com/about/
third_amended_and_restated_articles_of_incorporation.pdf.  
  The central question for the director (and for the 
corporation and its shareholders in terms of who bears the loss) 
often becomes not so much whether the lawsuit has merit 
(although that remains important), but rather who should be able 
 46. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subdiv. 2(a) (2008).  It is of course subject to 
statutory limitations as well.  Id.    
 47. The absence of a finding of liability increases the probability that an 
insurer will provide coverage under a D&O policy.  Cf. BLOCK, supra note 33, at 
1851 (“The more likely it is that lawsuits against directors will not be resolved in 
favor of directors at an early stage of litigation, the more likely it is that 
indemnifiable and/or insured against defense costs (particularly attorneys’ fees) 
will be high . . .”). 
 48. This brings the concept of indemnification to the public policy criticism 
that corporate funds should not be used to excuse directors for misconduct.  See 
id. at 1969. 
 49. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 
1097–98 (2006). 
 50. See id. 
 51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
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to decide whether the lawsuit should be settled and, if so, on what 
terms to settle the suit.   
Now that settlements have become the focus of our discussion, 
we can explore how they are handled in derivative suits under the 
guidance of the business judgment rule. 
C.  Shareholders’ Remedies: The Derivative Suit 
1. The Basics: How It Differs from Class Actions and How It Was 
Used in UnitedHealth. 
When shareholders allege that the directors have violated the 
duty of care or the duty of loyalty, and the injury is to all 
shareholders alike, then any suit alleging liability must be brought 
in the name of the corporation and for the benefit of all the 
shareholders.52  In these circumstances, permitting individual suits 
by separate shareholders would waste time and money.53  Only 
where the plaintiff can allege separate and distinct injury to him or 
herself may the plaintiff sue directly and not derivatively.54  Suits 
brought on behalf of all shareholders, then, are denoted as 
“derivative.”55
Thus, the state and federal derivative suits against officers and 
directors of UHG were brought in the name of UHG and for the 
benefit of all shareholders alike.
  
56  On the other hand, the class 
action suit for alleged violation of the federal securities laws was 
brought to recover for loss caused to the individual members of the 
class.57
 
 52. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1379–80 (quoting Kamen v. Kemper 
Fin. Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991)).   
  For instance, a shareholder who had bought or sold in 
reliance on the misstated financials issued by the corporation 
during the class period would sue for his or her own recovery and 
 53. 2 COX & HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 15.03 (2d ed. 2003). 
 54. Id. § 15.02. 
 55. BLOCK, supra note 33, at 1380 (“[t]he claim is brought derivatively because 
‘those in control of the company refuse or fail to assert’ the claim belonging to 
the corporation”) (quoting Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 
264 (Del. 1995)). 
 56. See Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 4 (in the Prayer for Relief, the shareholder plaintiffs asked for relief to be 
granted to UHG). 
 57. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 3 (in their prayer for relief, the 
plaintiffs did not ask for “injunctive relief in favor of the corporation,” but rather 
in favor of themselves).  
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not for the benefit of all shareholders.58
2. The Stages of the Derivative Suit 
   
A derivative suit is a potential asset of the corporation, and as 
such, is subject to the control and management of the board 
unless, for any reason, the board is disqualified from fairly 
exercising such control and management.59  This concept can be 
traced back to its origins in a case before an English court in the 
early 1800s.60
Given the board’s authority to control derivative suits, a 
potential plaintiff must either make a demand on the board that it 
bring suit against the wrongdoers,
   
61
 
 58. Justice Frankfurter depicts a good example: “if a corporation rearranges 
the relationship of different classes of security-holders to the detriment of one 
class, a stockholder in the disadvantaged class may proceed against the 
corporation . . . .”  2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 
 or allege to the court with 
particularity that, due to having a conflict of interest, the board is 
53, § 15.02 (citing Smith v. 
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).  In UnitedHealth, the 
corporation (shareholders generally) paid the individual members of the class 
$895 million under the terms of the settlement.  See STANFORD REPORT, supra note 
3. 
 59. BLOCK, supra note 33, at 1380.  The derivative suit nevertheless equates to 
the procedure by which shareholders “compel the corporation to sue.”  Id. at 1381 
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)). 
 60. Hidrens v. Congreve, 38 Eng. Rep. 917 (1828).  More derivative cases 
followed Hidrens.  In one case, two shareholders of a corporation, the Victoria Park 
Company, sued the directors for fraud and other “illegal transactions.”  Hawes v. 
City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 454–55 (1881) (referring to Foss v. Harbottle, 67 
Eng. Rep. 189 (1843)).  The court upheld the defendant directors’ demurrer 
motion because the plaintiffs neither obtained an action from the majority of the 
shareholders nor showed that no acting board could otherwise bring the suit.  Id.  
More simply put, minority shareholders should not litigate internal disputes 
because the corporation, as an entity, must first decide whether litigation is even 
appropriate.  Id.  Therefore, either the majority of shareholders or the directors 
decided this matter unless they abused that power through fraud or other illegal 
conduct.  See id. (referring to MacDougall v. Gardiner, (1875) 1 Ch.D. 13).  As 
shown by Hawes, U.S. courts still required shareholders to first “induce remedial 
action” by the board so long as it was feasible.  Id. at 460–61.   
 61. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, § 15.06 (citing a number of cases as 
examples, including Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460–61 (1882); Barr 
v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1975); and Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 
411, 414 (Del. Ch. 1924)).  “The demand must, at a minimum, ‘identify the 
alleged wrongdoers, describe the factual basis of the wrongful acts and the harm 
caused to the corporation, and request remedial relief.’”  2 BLOCK ET AL., supra 
note 33, at 1428 (quoting Allison v. Gen. Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1117 
(D. Del.), aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
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incapable of asserting or maintaining the lawsuit. 62  Should the 
plaintiff make a demand, at least under applicable Delaware law, 
the plaintiff confesses that the board can control and manage the 
lawsuit effectively.63  In the absence of a conflict of interest, the 
board’s decision with respect to the demand and the maintenance 
or termination of the suit is reviewed under the business judgment 
rule.64
If, on the other hand, the plaintiff alleges with particularity 
that the board is, by reason of conflict of interest, incapable of such 
management, then the court may recognize that demand would be 
futile.
  
65  If the plaintiff’s claim survives a dismissal motion, the 
lawsuit is up and running and outside the management and control 
of the board.66
In both the federal and state derivative suits involving UHG, 
the plaintiffs alleged such a conflict
   
67 and there was no dismissal of 
the complaints on the pleadings.68
 
 62. Nevertheless, shareholders may surpass this requirement by showing that 
their demand was either futile or “wrongfully refused.”  2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 
33, at 1454–55.  Wrongful refusal typically happens when the board negligently 
decides to forego a derivative suit or acts in bad faith.  See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra 
note 33, at 1608–1609 (citing Stepak v. Addison, 20 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1994)); see 
also 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 
  Now the reader could assume 
that if the plaintiff could survive a challenge to the allegation that 
the board was conflicted, then the plaintiff’s suit would proceed to 
trial without further interference from the board.  This, however, is 
53, at 928–29 (citing Atkins v. Hibernia Corp., 182 
F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 63. See, e.g., Stotland v. GAF Corp., 469 A.2d 421, 423 (Del. 1983). 
 64. See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 
261, 263, 37 S.Ct. 509, 510 (1917); 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1454–55; see E. 
Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate 
Law and Governance From 1992–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1465–1466 (2005). 
 65. Demand futility commonly occurs when the directors commit the 
misconduct at issue.  See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, at 922 (citing Wolgin v. 
Simon, 722 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1984)).  It also occurs when the directors are 
otherwise interested in the legal matter.  See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1467–
68 (citing Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 228 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1990)). 
 66. See 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 53, at 922. 
 67. See Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 4, at ¶ 272 (“Plaintiffs did not make a demand . . . because . . . there is not a 
majority of disinterested and independent directors on UnitedHealth’s board to 
appropriately consider a demand as all of UnitedHealth’s twelve directors have 
disabling interests or conflicts.  As such, demand should be excused.”). 
 68. See In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV-
1216 (JMR/FLN), 06-CV-1691 (JMR/FLN), 2007 WL 4571127 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 
2007) (by this point, the court had not dismissed any of the complaints). 
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not the case.69  Boards have been given broad authority to create 
committees and charge those committees with conduct of board 
business as delegated.70  This authority includes managing 
lawsuits.71
In Zapata v. Maldonado,
  But could a board that was itself conflicted nevertheless 
appoint a committee of persons who were not members of the 
board and charge them with authority to manage and even dismiss 
the case?  Could such a committee so appointed do something that 
the board itself could not do? 
72 a derivative complaint was filed in 
Delaware alleging that demand should be excused because of 
board conflict.73  The conflicted board appointed an SLC 
consisting of persons who were not board members.74  The SLC 
then moved to terminate the lawsuit as being not in the best 
interests of the corporation.75  The plaintiff challenged the ability 
of a conflicted board to so act, but the Delaware Supreme Court 
held that, subject to conditions reviewed below, such an SLC could 
decide effectively that the lawsuit be terminated, thus cutting the 
ground out from underneath the plaintiff.76  Two years earlier, the 
New York Court of Appeals held in Auerbach v. Bennett77 that in a 
similar situation an SLC could so decide, but its decision would 
receive significantly greater judicial deference than that in Zapata.78
The following section shows how directors can appoint an 
 
 
 69. See Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 1979).  The 
court rejected the shareholder plaintiffs’ argument, in the words derived from 
Lasker v. Burks, that “disinterested directors of an investment company do not have 
the power to foreclose the continuation of nonfrivolous litigation brought by 
shareholders against majority directors for breach of their fiduciary duties.”  Id. at 
728 (quoting Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d 441 U.S. 
471 (1979)).  The reason was that the Lasker decision was later reversed.  See Burks 
v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 99 S.Ct. 1831 (1979).  The Abbey court concluded that an 
independent committee, appointed even by a minority of the board members, 
enjoyed business judgment rule protection since the business judgment rule 
“applies to any reasonable good faith determination by an independent board of 
directors that the derivative action is not in the best interests of the corporation.”  
Abbey, 603 F.2d at 730. 
 70. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 (2008). 
 71. Id. at subdiv. 1. 
 72. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). 
 73. Id. at 780. 
 74. Id. at 781. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 789 (“If the Court’s independent business judgment is satisfied, the 
Court may proceed to grant the motion, subject, of course, to any equitable terms 
or conditions the Court finds necessary or desirable.”). 
 77. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). 
 78. See id. at 999–1000; see also Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788–89.  
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independent SLC even though that suit is based on a well-pleaded 
conflict of interest with respect to the board.  Because an SLC can 
trump a well-pleaded complaint, the reader should keep in mind 
that the rules relating to selection of the members of an SLC, 
delegation of authority to the SLC, and performance of the 
responsibilities so delegated by the SLC, should be subject to some 
measure of judicial oversight and review.   
III. SLCS 
A. Auerbach and Zapata: Minnesota’s Starting Point for Reviewing 
SLCs. 
Minnesota courts have reviewed SLC decisions under the 
guidance of the business judgment rule.79  Under this rule, courts 
have upheld SLC decisions if the SLC was independent from the 
corporation and investigated the matter adequately and in good 
faith.80  Prior to UnitedHealth, it was unclear under Minnesota law 
whether SLC recommendations required factual support or merely 
a showing that the SLC investigated the suit adequately and in good 
faith.81
In Auerbach v. Bennet,
  Across the country, two conflicting ideas developed with 
respect to how strictly courts should review SLC recommendations. 
82 the New York Court of Appeals limited 
judicial review to assessing whether the SLC independently 
investigated the derivative suit with appropriate procedure and in 
good faith.83
 
 79. See Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003).  See 
also MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (2008). 
  The underlying derivative complaint in that case 
alleged that certain members of the board were involved in illegal 
 80. See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 209–10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).  
While this standard was not expressly accepted in Janssen, it was nevertheless 
applied by Janssen without any changes.  See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884. 
 81. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV-
1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007). 
 82. 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). 
 83. Id. at 1002–03.  The question of adequacy regarding investigatory 
methods depends on the “nature and characteristics of the particular subject 
being investigated . . . .”  Id. at 1003.  In this case, the SLC consisted of three 
members, which decided the outcome of a suit against four directors of a fifteen-
member board.  Id. at 1001.  The court upheld the SLC’s motion to dismiss the 
suit, because the committee selected the appropriate procedures.  Id. at 1002.  The 
court went on to say that the decision was thus properly based on the investigation 
and was outside the scope of review.  Id.   
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overseas payments (bribes) over a period of years.84  The board 
appointed an SLC consisting of three directors who joined the 
board after the occurrence of these alleged payments.85  The SLC 
was given full authority (without review by the board) to handle the 
lawsuit.86  Based on the SLC’s decision, the supreme court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s suit; subsequently, however, the appellate 
division reversed.87
On further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals sustained 
dismissal of the complaint, concluding that “the determination of 
the special litigation committee forecloses further judicial inquiry 
in this case.”
 
88  The business judgment rule required this outcome 
“absent evidence of bad faith or fraud (of which there is none 
here).”89  The court observed that “the business judgment rule 
does not foreclose inquiry by the courts into the disinterested 
independence of those members of the board chosen by it to make 
the corporate decision on its behalf” but concluded that nothing in 
the record raised a triable fact issue regarding the SLC’s 
independence.90  The court further recognized that “the selection 
of procedures” was appropriate and “the ultimate substantive 
decision . . . not to pursue the claims” was based on these 
procedures.91  Under this recognition, the court concluded that 
there was no need to examine the substantive findings, for doing so 
would intrude improperly on the business judgment rule.92
In Zapata v. Maldonado,
 
93 the Delaware Supreme Court 
introduced a potentially stricter judicial scrutiny of SLC decisions, 
suggesting the importance of ensuring that the SLC report would 
contain findings and well reasoned conclusions.94
 
 84. Id. at 997. 
  This court 
prescribed a two-step standard.  The first step involved an 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 998. 
 88. Id. at 1000. 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 1001. 
 91. Id. at 1002. 
 92. Id.  
 93. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).   
 94. See id.  In this case, a stockholder brought action to recover against ten 
officers and directors for breaches of fiduciary duties.  Id. at 780.  The board 
elected an SLC, which concluded that the derivative suit should be dismissed.  Id. 
at 781.  The defendant moved for dismissal or summary judgment.  Id. at 780.  The 
trial court granted the summary judgment motion and the plaintiff appealed.  Id. 
at 781.   
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assessment of the SLC’s good faith and independence similar to 
the Auerbach process.95  The court retained, however, a second 
discretionary step, in which it might exercise its own “business 
judgment” in determining whether to grant the SLC’s motion to 
dismiss the derivative suit.96  Delaware courts have not applied the 
second step in every case, but rather only when “corporate actions 
meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to 
satisfy its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply 
prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further 
consideration in the corporation’s interest.”97
The Zapata court supported its adoption of this two-step 
standard by emphasizing that if SLCs are not required to provide 
substantive support for their recommendations, “corporations can 
consistently wrest bona fide derivative actions away from well-
meaning derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee 
mechanism,” causing the derivative suit to lose effectiveness as a 
policing tool.
 
98
B. How the Conflict Between Auerbach and Zapata Influenced 
Minnesota Case Law Before UnitedHealth. 
   
Prior to UnitedHealth, Minnesota courts seemingly applied the 
Auerbach standard, but had not explicitly disavowed review of the 
SLC report in the “business judgment” of the court.99
The Minnesota legislature codified the permitted use of SLCs 
in 1981.
  Nevertheless, 
the history behind the Auerbach-Zapata clash in Minnesota helps 
illustrate how the UnitedHealth court decided which standard of 
review to choose. 
100
 
 95. Id. at 788.  However, the task of ensuring good faith and independence 
included substantively reviewing the SLC’s findings.  See id. at 788–89.   
  For the first time since this codification, the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals confronted the issue of how it should review an 
 96. Id. at 789.   
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 786. 
 99. See, e.g., Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 2003) 
(acknowledging the past support for the Auerbach standard yet declining to affirm 
whether a more exacting standard of review is necessary). 
 100. Act of May 27, 1981, ch. 270, § 43, 1981 Minn. Laws 1141, 1168 (codified at 
MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1982)), repealed by Act of May 19, 1989, ch. 172, § 11, 1989 
Minn. Laws 421, 429.  The state statute mandated that SLCs shall be composed of 
either two or more disinterested directors or independent persons to decide 
whether pursuing litigation will best serve the corporation.  MINN. STAT. § 
302A.243 (1982).  
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SLC report in Black v. NuAire, Inc.101  Nuaire Inc. (“Nuaire”) 
designed, produced, and sold air filtering devices for medical and 
industrial research.102  The plaintiff was a NuAire shareholder who 
alleged that NuAire breached the duty of loyalty by awarding Max 
Peters, a director and major shareholder, grossly excessive 
compensation.103
Thereafter, an independent member of the NuAire board 
appointed an SLC, which concluded that except for a deferred 
compensation agreement entered into with Max Peters, all other 
charges were meritless.
  
104  Hence, the SLC proposed terminating 
the lawsuit so long as the board would rescind the deferred 
compensation agreement.105  Once the board rescinded the 
agreement, the trial court dismissed the suit, reasoning that the 
SLC had been comprised of disinterested members and 
investigated the matter in good faith.106
On appeal, the plaintiffs asked the court to review the merits 
of the committee’s recommendations.
   
107  The court of appeals 
declined, stating that “the trial court properly limited its inquiry to 
whether the appointed committee members were disinterested 
within the meaning of section 302A.243 and conducted their 
investigation in good faith.”108
The court of appeals revisited this issue in Drilling v. Berman.
   
109
Prior to 1989, Minn. Stat. § 302A.243 (1988) restricted 
judicial review of a special litigation committee decision to 
terminate a derivative suit to a determination of whether 
the committee was disinterested and made its decision in 
good faith.  In 1989, the legislature repealed Minn. Stat. § 
302A.243.  In repealing the section, the legislature made it 
  
In Drilling, the court examined how subsequent Minnesota 
legislation had affected the issue of reviewability of SLC decisions:  
 
 101. 426 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 102. Id. at 205. 
 103. See id. at 205–06.  Additional allegations included: “(1) wrongful hiring of 
relatives; (2) excessive salaries and business expenses; (3) wrongful Turnpike 
Investment transactions; (4) illegal diversion of NuAire funds; (5) secrecy and 
concealment of unlawful acts; (6) failure to pay dividends; and (7) excessive fringe 
benefits[.]”  Id. at 206. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 206–07. 
 106. Id. at 207. 
 107. Id. at 208–09. 
 108. Id. at 211. 
 109. 589 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999). 
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clear it was not commenting on the substance of the 
section and that its repeal ‘must be interpreted in the 
same manner as if section 302A.243 had not been 
enacted.’  The legislature took that action in recognition 
that Minnesota was one of the few states with legislation 
governing judicial review of special litigation committees.  
The repeal represented ‘a commitment to let the caselaw 
develop,’ and a desire to give our courts flexibility. 110
The Drilling court acknowledged the thoroughness of the SLC 
process: the SLC “reviewed thousands of documents provided by 
the parties.  It also interviewed four witnesses.”
   
111  But the plaintiffs 
argued that the SLC failed to demonstrate good faith because their 
conclusions were not explained.112  The court countered that good 
faith is not measured by the substance, but rather the nature of the 
investigation.113  To measure the adequacy of the SLC’s 
investigation, the Drilling court adopted factors used by the 
Tennessee Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Boyd,114 which included: 
“(1) the length and scope of the investigation, (2) the committee’s 
use of independent counsel or experts, (3) the corporation’s or the 
defendant’s involvement, if any, in the investigation, and (4) the 
adequacy and reliability of the information supplied to the 
committee.”115
Thus far, the appellate court decisions suggested that perhaps 
the Auerbach approach provided the appropriate standard of review 
for SLC decisions in Minnesota.  Prior to the UnitedHealth case 
however, Janssen v. Best & Flanagan
 
116 was the only Minnesota 
Supreme Court decision that addressed this issue.117  In Janssen, a 
derivative suit was brought by a nonprofit corporation, the 
Minneapolis Police Relief Association (“MPRA”), for an alleged 
negligently conducted business investment.118
 
 110. Id. at 506 (citations omitted). 
  The investment 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 507. 
 113. Id. at 509.  The court further clarified that good faith is not shown by 
proper substantive support but rather appropriate procedures and methodologies.  
Id. 
 114. 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 115. Drilling, 589 N.W.2d at 509 (citing Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224).  Note that 
none of these factors pertain to the factual basis for conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 116. 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 879. 
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allegedly cost the company $15 million.119  Unlike the general 
Minnesota corporation statute, the nonprofit statute, chapter 317A, 
did not have a provision comparable to section 302A.241 expressly 
authorizing the appointment of SLCs.120  Nevertheless, the supreme 
court held that the power to do so was necessarily implicit in the 
nonprofit statute.121
The Janssen case illustrates that SLCs are not necessarily 
infallible.  The MPRA appointed Robert A. Murnane, an attorney, 
to investigate the derivative suit.
  
122  The MPRA specifically 
instructed Murnane not to review the “factual findings, 
determinations, events or circumstances” described in prior reports 
and discovery materials in a similar lawsuit.123  Because this 
instruction restricted the scope of the SLC investigation, the 
supreme court agreed with the lower court that “Murnane, as a 
special litigation committee, failed to meet the threshold test of 
independence and good faith,” and allowed the lawsuit to 
proceed.124
In so ruling, the court further critiqued Murnane’s 
investigation on which he based his conclusion as SLC:  
   
In addition, we conclude that Murnane did not engage in 
a good faith attempt to deduce the best interest of MPRA 
with respect to the litigation against Best & Flanagan.  
Murnane never interviewed Janssen or their attorneys, a 
fundamental task in reaching an informed decision about 
the merits of their complaints.  Murnane also gave no 
indication that he had undertaken the careful 
consideration of all the germane benefits and detriments 
to MPRA that is indicative of a good faith business 
decision.125
The court then refused to recognize the subsequent attempt of 
the MPRA to give Murnane a general and unlimited instruction 
holding that the initial delegation of authority to the SLC must be 
complete and not subject to subsequent amendment or further 
  
 
 119. Id. 
 120. MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 (2008). 
 121. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883–84, 88. 
 122. Id. at 880. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 888.  This rule is otherwise known as the one-strike rule.  For an 
analysis of the one-strike rule, see Eric J. Moutz, Janssen v. Best and Flanagan: At 
Long Last, The Beginning of the End for the Auerbach Approach in Minnesota?, 30 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 489, 504–09 (2003). 
 125. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 889. 
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oversight by the board.126
Therefore, up to this point, Minnesota law suggested that 
substantive judicial review of the process followed by an SLC might 
be appropriate for deciding whether the SLC was independent and 
acted in good faith.
 
127
The Special Litigation Committee[’s] . . . lack of any 
findings leaves no tracks showing why or how its business 
judgment can be considered reasonable. . . . Ultimately, 
the Court asks whether Minnesota law makes an SLC an 
impenetrable “black box,” whose decisions and evaluative 
processes are immune from review in a shareholders’ 
derivative suit.  Put another way, does the business 
judgment rule foreclose any action, beyond the Court’s 
rubber stamping an SLC’s decision?
  In the course of the UnitedHealth litigation, 
specifically when the SLC report arrived on Federal District Court 
Chief Judge Rosenbaum’s desk, he expressed concerns about the 
report and found the need to ask the Minnesota Supreme Court 
for advice.  He observed: 
128
As the reader will see, the Minnesota Supreme Court answered 
his question, but may not have solved the problems he raised.  
 
IV. IN RE UNITEDHEALTH GROUP INC. SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE 
LITIGATION 
A. Facts and Procedure 
In March of 2006, a Wall Street Journal article suggested that a 
number of different corporations in this country were possibly 
backdating stock options.129
 
 126. See id. at 889–90. 
  One of the companies mentioned was 
 127. See Moutz, supra note 124, at 511.  Moutz explains that 
Janssen did not directly address the propriety of these decisions, but it did 
present a framework that, if followed in subsequent decisions, would 
seem to suggest that a less-deferential approach to special litigation 
committee decisions is now the law of Minnesota.  The precise contours 
of this new approach have yet to be defined by the courts, but the 
fundamental logic of Janssen and strong public policy concerns suggest 
that a version of the Zapata or Miller approaches may be appropriate. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 128. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV-
1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007) (referring to 
MINN. STAT. § 480.065, subdiv. 3 (2006)). 
 129. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A1. 
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UnitedHealth, a Minnesota corporation.130  According to the 
article, Dr. William McGuire, who was then UHG’s CEO, received a 
large block of options that just happened to be dated the day UHG 
stock prices hit their low for the year—“unusually propitious” 
timing.131  The Journal article, referring to a pattern of such awards, 
stated that “the odds of such a favorable pattern occurring by 
chance would be one in 200 million or greater.”132 The article also 
mentioned that an SEC inquiry was underway.133
Why would “backdating” be a problem?  The “date” of the 
grant would fix the strike price for exercise of the option and the 
potential value of the option would be the difference between that 
strike price and the market price at date of sale of the shares 
subject to the option.
  
134  This potential profit spread would be 
magnified by choosing as the date when the grant was allegedly 
issued a time when the UHG stock price was low.135  Granting 
options with a strike price below the market price prevailing as of 
the date the option was granted would involve breach of the rules 
and policies established by board as well as shareholder action.136  
Moreover, it would require complex adjustments to UHG’s 
accounting for the cost of such options.137  Issuing UHG financials 
that failed to account for such adjustments, if required, would 
constitute the provision of false information to persons buying and 
selling UHG stock on the market.138  Stockholders would be led to 
conclude that UHG employee wages were less—and thus profits 
were more—than they actually were.139
Shortly after the Wall Street Journal article was published, the 
SEC notified UHG that it had commenced an informal inquiry into 
 
 
 130. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 
544, 548 (Minn. 2008). 
 131. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A1. 
 132. Id.  See also SLC Report, supra note 9, at 5. 
 133. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A1. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Verified Derivative Action Complaint ¶ 4, In re UnitedHeath Group, 
Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 0:06-cv-
01216-JMR-FLN), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1036/UNH_01/
2006329_o01c_060121.pdf. 
 137. See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 1, at A2, ¶ 12.   
 138. See SEC Complaint, supra note 2. 
 139. See id.  “[Backdating] caused investors to believe, falsely, that the 
Company granted options with strike prices equal to the fair market value of 
UnitedHealth stock on the date of grant.”  See id. ¶ 4.  
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UHG’s stock option granting practices.140  UHG then appointed a 
committee of directors to review UHG’s stock option granting 
practices.141  This committee then retained the Wilmer Cutler law 
firm as counsel to assist in this review.142  Following a very intensive 
study and investigation, Wilmer Cutler reported to the committee 
that “[t]he measurement dates used by the Company for most of 
the option grants . . . under review were incorrect, and many of the 
option grants were likely backdated.”143  Grants to senior officers 
were approved by the board’s compensation committee.144  The 
chair of that committee also chaired an ad hoc committee 
appointed in 1999 to negotiate the long-term employment 
contracts for the CEO and the president at that time.145  The 
employment contract for the CEO assured the grant of 1,000,000 
options.146
Significantly, the report noted that during this time frame, the 
chair of the compensation committee served as “a trustee for two 
trusts for the benefit of each of Dr. McGuire’s children,” managed 
assets for the CEO that fluctuated “from approximately $15 million 
in 1996 to over $55 million in 2006,” and “accepted an investment 
of $500,000 from Dr. McGuire in connection with [the chair’s] 
repurchase of the money management firm that bears his 
name . . . .”
  
147  Stock option grants, the report noted, were regularly 
approved by written action of the board’s compensation 
committee, and for a substantial number of these grants it was 
“determined that the Written Actions that were ‘[d]ate[d]’ on a 
specific date were executed subsequently.”148
The wave of litigation had commenced earlier.  On March 29, 
2006, shareholders filed a derivative suit in federal district court in 
Minneapolis against various current and former officers and 
directors of UHG.
 
149
 
 140. WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE & DORR LLP, REPORT TO THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, INC., available at 
http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/assets/shared/Wilmer_Hale_Report.pdf 
[hereinafter Wilmer Cutler Report] (last visited Oct. 19, 2009). 
  The shareholders alleged breaches of 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 4. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 13. 
 147. Id. at 8. 
 148. Id. at 5.  
 149. See Verified Derivative Action Complaint ¶ 1, Brandin v. McGuire, No. 
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fiduciary duty,150 and their suit was later consolidated with various 
other derivative suits.151  Additionally, another lawsuit was filed in 
the Minnesota district court, alleging violations of federal securities 
laws and seeking court approval of the suit as a class action.152  The 
lead plaintiff in this suit was California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (CalPERS).153  On April 24, 2006, a shareholder 
filed a state derivative suit in Hennepin County District Court, 
which was consolidated with other state court actions. 154
On October 31, 2008, UHG announced it had reached an 
agreement to settle the SEC’s investigation.
 
155  Without admitting 
or denying the SEC’s allegations, UHG agreed to a permanent 
injunction against any future violations of certain reporting, books 
and records, and internal accounting control provisions of the 
federal securities laws.156
The SEC brought civil actions against both the former CEO 
and former general counsel that resulted in very large financial 
penalties and other injunctive relief.  “[T]he parties reached a 
settlement in which [the CEO] agreed to return $400 million to 
UnitedHealth and pay a $7 million civil fine.”
  
157  In settling the SEC 
action, McGuire agreed not to “make or permit to be made any 
public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in 
the [SEC] complaint or creating the impression that the complaint 
is without factual basis.”158
When the Wilmer Cutler report became public on October 15, 
2006, the former CEO tendered his resignation, and on the same 
   
 
06CV01216, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Mar. 29, 2006).  
 150. Id. 
 151. See Amended Consolidated Derivative and Class Action Complaint, supra 
note 4. 
 152. Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities Laws, 
Krause v. UnitedHealth Group, Inc., No. 06 CV 1691 ADM/JSM, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 
943442006 2006 WL 2427400 (D. Minn. May 5, 2006).  
 153. See Order Designating Lead Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s Counsel, In re 
UnitedHealth Group, Inc. PSLRA Litig., No. 06-cv-01691 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2006), 
available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1036/UNH_01/2006914_f01x_061691.pdf.  
 154. See State Consolidated Derivative Complaint, supra note 5.     
 155. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of SLC’s Motions for 
Preliminary Approval and Dismissal, In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder 
Derivative Litig., No. 06-1216 (JMR/FLN), 631 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. Oct. 31, 
2008), 2008 WL 4843870. 
 156. UnitedHealth Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 86 (Dec. 31, 
2008), available at http://unitedhealthgroup.com/invest/2008/Final_10-K_2008.pdf. 
 157. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 
544, 548 (Minn. 2008). 
 158. Id. 
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date the former general counsel left his position, retiring from 
UHG at the end of the year.159  The chair of the compensation 
committee resigned that same month.160
Earlier, on July 19, 2006, UHG had responded to the derivative 
suits by creating a two-member SLC under Minnesota Statutes 
section 302.241A, subdivision 1.
 
161  In its report, the SLC listed legal 
defenses pertaining to each derivative claim, yet acknowledged that 
most claims had merit.162  It recommended a settlement and 
dismissal of the claims against the former CEO and the other 
defendants for both the state and federal derivative suits.163
The proposed settlement called for the former CEO to 
relinquish approximately $320 million in UHG stock options, 
surrender his rights to his UHG retirement plan and executive 
savings plan, and relinquish any claim he might have had to post-
employment benefits.
 
164  The “total economic value” McGuire 
would relinquish under the settlement amounted to approximately 
$420 million.165  The proposed settlement also called for the former 
general counsel to repay earnings from the exercise of options in 
the amount of $20.55 million, relinquish rights to severance 
benefits of $1.95 million, and relinquish options to purchase 
273,000 shares with a value of approximately $5.5 million.166  
Together with earlier transactions, the total value relinquished to 
UHG was $30.7 million.167
 
 159. SLC Report, supra note 
  Finally, a proposed settlement 
agreement recommended binding arbitration with the former 
Chair of the Compensation Committee over the fair settlement 
9. 
 160. Id. at 17. 
 161. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 548.  Both SLC members formerly served 
on the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Id.  The two members furthermore sought 
guidance from Professor Lyman P.Q. Johnson regarding matters of corporate law 
and governance; Krolls Litigation Consulting and Forensics practice on 
accounting issues; and Professor Brad Cornell of CRA International on issues 
regarding economics and damages.  SLC Report, supra note 9. 
 162. See, e.g., SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.B.  Until the SLC completed and 
issued its report, McGuire was prohibited by a preliminary injunction placed by 
the federal district court in the district of Minnesota on November 29, 2006, from 
“exercising any UnitedHealth stock options without court approval.”  In re 
UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d. at 548.   
 163. SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.B. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. ¶ IV.C. 
 167. Id. 
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value of the claims against him in the derivative actions.168
B. Judge Rosenbaum’s Misgivings 
 
Upon reviewing the SLC materials, Judge Rosenbaum, 
presiding over both the direct and derivative actions filed in the 
Minnesota Federal District Court, expressed concerns.169  The end 
result, he suggested, would still allow the former CEO to retain 
$800 million.170
The Special Litigation Committee has apparently made a 
business judgment favoring settling the Board’s and 
UHG’s possible claims against its former officers on terms 
outlined in its report.  But its lack of any findings leaves 
no tracks showing why or how its business judgment can 
be considered reasonable.  Its business judgment may 
close the inquiry, leaving a Court mute, and charged only 
with the ministerial duty to sign off on the deal and 
dismiss the derivative suit.  Or there may be other 
alternatives.  Ultimately, the Court asks whether 
Minnesota law makes an SLC an impenetrable “black 
box,” whose decisions and evaluative processes are 
immune from review in a shareholders’ derivative suit.  
Put another way, does the business judgment rule 
foreclose any action, beyond the Court’s rubber stamping 
an SLC’s decision?
  Moreover, the SLC report contained no specific 
findings or reasons supporting the SLC’s conclusions that the 
derivative claims should all be dismissed: 
171
Since Judge Rosenbaum was unsure whether he had authority 
under Minnesota law to review the reasonableness of the SLC’s 
decision,
 
172
 
 168. Id. ¶ IV.D. 
 he certified to the Minnesota Supreme Court the 
following question: “Does Minnesota’s business judgment rule 
foreclose a court from a) examining the reasonableness of, or b) 
rejecting on the merits, a settlement of a derivative action proposed 
by a Special Litigation Committee duly constituted under 
 169. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV-
1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *6 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 2007). 
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. 
 172. In trying to find the answer, the district court briefly summarized the 
history of Minnesota’s case law and statutes, yet it could find no decisions 
affirming the Auerbach rule from the Minnesota Supreme Court; hence, it did not 
have the sufficient precedent to be certain.  See id. at *6–7. 
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Minnesota Statutes § 302A.241 subd. 1?”173
C.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision and Underlying Analysis 
 
The supreme court’s majority opinion began by reformulating 
the question asked and stating the question it would answer as 
follows: 
To what extent does the business judgment rule as 
recognized in Minnesota law require a court, in deciding 
whether to approve a proposed settlement of a 
shareholder derivative action, to defer to the decision of a 
Special Litigation Committee duly constituted under 
Minn. Stat. § 302A.241, subd. 1 (2006), that the derivative 
action should be settled on specific terms?174
The supreme court answered that judicial review was to be 
limited to the issues of independence and good faith and that the 
business judgment rule precluded judicial review of the substance 
of the SLC decision.
  
175  Thus, the answer to Judge Rosenbaum’s 
question was “no,” the court could not examine the reasonableness 
of the SLC’s decision or reject it on the merits, unless the court’s 
review addressed, and was confined to, the two factors of 
independence and good faith.176  Justice Paul Anderson’s 
concurring opinion would have found a basis for the court to 
review the rationality of the SLC report.177
Plaintiffs had argued that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23.1(c) trumped the applicability of the Minnesota business 
judgment rule to the SLC report because it required that the 
derivative suits could be “settled, voluntarily dismissed, or 
compromised only with the court’s approval.”
 
178  The supreme 
court held that the comparable Minnesota rule was procedural and 
not substantive, and therefore not applicable to Judge 
Rosenbaum’s decision.179
 
 173. In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 
549 (Minn. 2008) (quoting In re UnitedHealth, 2007 WL 4571127, at *8). 
  The Court left the federal rule for Judge 
 174. Id. at 549. 
 175. Id. at 561. 
 176. Id. 
 177. See infra Part IV.D. 
 178. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 552 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23.1(c)). 
 179. Id.  UHG was a Minnesota corporation; hence, the Federal District Court 
of Minnesota needed to apply the substantive law of Minnesota.  See Erie R.R. Co. 
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (requiring federal courts handling diversity cases 
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Rosenbaum to interpret and apply if appropriate.180  In later 
granting approval to the SLC report, Judge Rosenbaum did not 
invoke the federal rule.181
To answer the certified question as reformulated, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court defined a standard of review for SLC 
reports and decisions.  The court chose to adopt and follow the 
Auerbach (New York) line of authority rather than the Zapata 
(Delaware) line.
 
182  In following Auerbach, the court concluded it 
“should defer to an SLC’s decision to settle a shareholder 
derivative action if (1) the members of the SLC possessed a 
disinterested independence and (2) the SLC’s investigative 
procedures and methodologies were adequate, appropriate, and 
pursued in good faith.”183
The court apparently intended to separate one issue, as to 
whether findings and reasons were required, from the other issue 
of whether the SLC used appropriate “investigative procedures and 
methodologies.”
  
184  To justify excluding inquiry beyond the 
procedures and methodologies, the court argued that “findings 
and reasons” were part of the substantive action of the SLC and 
thus not subject to judicial requirement or review. 185
1. The Court’s Quest for Statutory Guidance 
  The court’s 
analysis, from statutes to public policy, set out its rationale for 
adopting the Auerbach approach. 
The court observed that “section 302A.241, subd. 1, does not 
addresses [sic] the deference to be afforded an SLC’s decision to 
settle a derivative action . . .” but does however mandate 
independence on part of the SLC.186
 
to look to the substantive law of the state in which the federal court was located). 
  The court then looked to the 
fiduciary duties of directors as provided in Minnesota statutes: 
 180. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 552.  
 181. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 631 F. Supp. 
2d 1151 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 182. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 556. 
 183. Id. at 559.  Adding to this standard, the court re-affirmed the Janssen rule 
and stated that “if the initial SLC investigation and recommendation fail to satisfy 
this standard, ‘the derivative suit proceeds on its merits’ with no opportunity to 
rectify any deficiencies.”  Id. (quoting Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 
889 (Minn. 2003)).   
 184. Id.  
 185. Id. (quotations added). 
 186. Id. at 553. 
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A director shall discharge the duties of the position of 
director in good faith, in a manner the director 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent 
person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances.  A person who so performs those duties is 
not liable by reason of being or having been a director of 
the corporation.187
The court acknowledged the good faith requirement as set out 
above but did not apply the “reasonably believes” wording to the 
decision of an SLC duly appointed under Minnesota Statutes 
section 302A.241.
  
188  The court’s failure to apply this 
reasonableness clause motivated Justice Paul Anderson’s departure 
in his concurring opinion.189  In his view, an SLC decision should 
be subject to a rationality standard in addition to the disinterred 
independence and good faith standards of Auerbach.190
2. Seeking Help from Case Law 
 
Since neither section 302A.241 nor section 302A.251 expressly 
directs courts to look beyond good faith and independence,191 the 
court looked to its past opinion in Janssen v. Best & Flanagan.192  
That decision however, gave no clear guidance on the issue of 
scope of review because the Janssen court neither accepted nor 
rejected the business judgment rule as applicable to an SLC’s 
decision.193  In Janssen, the issue rather turned on the court’s 
finding that the SLC was in fact not independent.194
Without controlling precedent or statutory guidance, the court 
compared Auerbach and Zapata on a policy analysis.
   
195
 
 187. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008). 
  The court 
 188. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 553, 559–60. 
 189. See infra Part IV.D. 
 190. See infra Part IV.D. 
 191. See MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.241, 302A.251 (2006). 
 192. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 551 (referring to Janssen v. Best & 
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003)). 
 193. Id. at 554.  Janssen established the minimum requirements of good faith 
and independence; however, the decision “explicitly declined to ‘adopt a 
particular version of the business judgment rule’” and rather assumed that the 
Auerbach standard would still apply.  In re UnitedHealth, Inc. S’holder Derivative 
Litig., Nos. 06-CV-1216, 06-CV-1691, 2007 WL 4571127, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec. 26, 
2007) (quoting and referring to Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 n.5).   
 194. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 554 (citing Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888). 
 195. See id. at 554–55. 
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adopted the Auerbach standard for the same reasons emphasized in 
the Auerbach decision.196  However, the supreme court added its own 
policy justifications: (1) corporate interests do not always mandate 
litigation, even when harm has been caused by one of the 
directors;197 (2) strike suits198 would increase if courts could inquire 
into the substantive reasonableness of SLC decisions;199 (3) the 
possibility of judicial bias is potentially greater than that of 
directors;200 and (4) courts should not replace business judgments 
in the name of public policy because courts do not have to deal 
with the long term economic consequences of a full litigation 
proceeding.201
The court believed that SLCs are trustworthy since “it seem[s] 
unlikely that a member of an SLC will reach a decision that could 
harm the company merely because he or she feels some empathy 
for the individuals under investigation.”
 
202  The court justified this 
statement with three general assertions: (1) SLCs were composed 
of individuals who spent their careers building business 
reputations; (2) since the SLC members in the UnitedHealth case 
were former members of the judiciary, the risk of improper 
influence was insignificant; and (3) derivative suits are not at risk of 
being completely undermined by the court’s adoption of the 
Auerbach standard.203
D. Justice Anderson’s Concurrence: The Idea of a Rationality Standard 
   
Justice Paul Anderson concurred with the majority in its 
decision to uphold the settlement, yet he believed the standard of 
 
 196. See id. at 556–57. 
 197. Id. at 557. 
 198. Strike suits are defined as “suit[s] . . . often based on no valid claim, 
brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated 
settlement.”  Id. at 550 n.4 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (8th ed. 
2004)). 
 199. Id. at 557. 
 200. This reasoning was based on the theory by Stephen M. Bainbridge, which 
asserted that market competition between firms creates incentive to “even the 
most self-interested directors” to act in the best interest of their corporations.  Id. 
at 558.  Courts to the contrary have no market forces encouraging them to make 
sensible business judgments.  Id. at 557–58 (referring to Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 122 (2004)). 
 201. Id. at 557.  The court also noted that the burden of proof was on the 
corporation to establish compliance with the standards.  Id. at 561. 
 202. Id. at 558. 
 203. Id.  The court finalized the rationale for its rule with the specific 
circumstances of the case—namely, that the suit was settled.  Id. at 559. 
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review needed a rationality requirement.204  He argued that the 
court’s standard gives excessive deference to SLC 
recommendations because it fails to address decisions that are “on 
their face, wholly irrational.”205  Such a result, he argued, conflicts 
with the language of section 302A.251, which requires a director 
who seeks protection of the business judgment rule to act “‘in a 
manner [he or she] reasonably believes to be in the best interests 
of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances.’”206
Justice Anderson argued the good faith standard was 
insufficient to deter irrational decisions by SLCs because good faith 
requires belief that one’s actions best serve the interests of the 
corporation, whereas rationality requires that such a belief be 
reasonable.
 
207  In other words, he argued that a director may have 
good intentions for the corporation and yet make a decision that is 
so irrational it violates Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251.208
Justice Anderson proposed a “middle-ground” approach which 
retains the requirements set forth in the court’s opinion only with 
the additional requirement that the SLC’s recommendation be 
shown to serve some “rational business purpose.”
  
209  Unlike the 
standard in Zapata, a reasonableness standard would not allow the 
autonomy and authority of the directors (respect for the business 
judgment rule) to be encroached upon by the courts because it still 
prohibits the courts from second-guessing SLC decisions by mere 
disagreement over which corporate interests deserve the greatest 
consideration.210  He argued that the risk of any potential over-
stepping would be diminished by the low probability that an 
independent investigation, conducted in good faith, would lead a 
sophisticated group of members to reach a senseless conclusion. 211
V. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITEDHEALTH DECISION 
 
The UnitedHealth decision precludes courts from reviewing the 
substance behind an SLC’s decision to dismiss a derivative suit so 
 
 204. See id. at 561–62 (Anderson, J., concurring). 
 205. Id. at 562. 
 206. Id. at 563 (citing MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2006)). 
 207. Id. (referring to the definition of good faith, which is stated in MINN. 
STAT. § 302A.011, subdiv. 13 (2006)). 
 208. See id. 
 209. Id. at 564–65. 
 210. See id. at 565. 
 211. See id. at 565–66. 
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long as the SLC is found to be independent, applies appropriate 
procedures in the investigation, and acts in good faith.212  SLCs do 
not have to specify why the derivative suits should be dismissed.213
Up front, the majority’s notion—that substantive review 
contradicts the business judgment rule—misstates the business 
judgment rule’s true meaning.  Even directors who are 
disinterested must not wrongfully refuse to sue.
  
Therein lies the central problem: confining judicial review to the 
SLC’s procedures and independence will not protect corporations 
when SLCs make irrational decisions or fail to document their 
decisions with findings of fact and well reasoned conclusions. 
214  Wrongful 
demand is characterized by the failure of directors to act “in an 
informed manner and with due care, in a good faith belief that their 
action was in the best interest of the corporation.”215  This version 
of the business judgment rule is not confined to Delaware cases; 
Minnesota also holds directors to this standard when demand is 
made by the shareholders.216
The UnitedHealth majority nevertheless refused to hold SLCs to 
the same expectation even though the SLC members were making 
the same decision the directors would have made had they been 
disinterested.
   
217  Consequently, SLCs can dismiss derivative suits 
wrongfully without repercussions because the Auerbach standard 
merely ensures the SLC will assert that they followed appropriate 
procedures.218
 
 212. See id. at 555 (majority opinion).  The court admits that “some judicial 
analysis of the manner in which a decisionmaker gathers the factual data 
underlying a decision” is acceptable under Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251, 
subdivision 2 (2006).  Id. at 559.  Also, while the decision pertained to a proposed 
settlement, the court clarified that the standard should apply to all SLC decisions, 
regardless of their specific recommendations.  See id. (stating that “the dismissal of 
meritorious litigation may be justifiable, such as when pursuit of the claim will 
prove more costly than beneficial.”). 
  Beyond that, they can make their decisions for 
 213. See id. 
 214. See supra note 62. 
 215. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1615 (quoting Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 
194, 197–98, 210 (Del. 1991) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 
1984))). 
 216. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 551 (noting that a business director is 
protected “[u]nder the business judgment rule, so long as a disinterested director 
makes ‘an informed business decision . . . .’”) (quoting Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 
662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003)).  
 217. Id. at 564 (Anderson, J., concurring).  
 218. Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 821, 872 (2004) ("If substance is beyond review, any amount of process 
can be overcome to reach the desired result: the decision maker need only hear 
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reasons unrelated to their factual findings, or worse, they can reach 
their decisions without making any factual findings.  Without some 
level of review, courts have no way of testing the appropriateness or 
adequacy of the processes used or the true disinterestedness of the 
members. 
The court may have been unwise to adopt the Auerbach 
standard.  Instead, the court should have adopted the Zapata 
standard because (1) it is more consistent with Minnesota statutes; 
(2) it addresses problems associated with tainted boards selecting 
their own SLC committees; and (3) it provides a basis for cross-
checking on true disinterestedness and appropriate process.  As has 
been pointed out above, the court may have been overly influenced 
by the personal make-up of the UHG SLC and may not have 
focused on the fact that the standards enunciated would apply 
equally to a small company (where temptations could be much 
more serious) as to a large public company. 219
A. Statutory Support for a More Enhanced Review 
 
As earlier stated, the Minnesota statute requires a director to 
make decisions “in a manner the director reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances.”220  The court stated that the choice of whether to sue 
or not is a business decision belonging to the corporation.221  It 
follows that even decisions to sue must be made reasonably to enjoy 
business judgment rule protection.222
Subdivision seven of section 302A.241 states that SLC members 
“are deemed to be directors for purposes of section[] 302A.251.”
  Strangely, the UnitedHealth 
court concluded differently. 
223  
By cherry picking only some requirements from this section, the 
court gave short shrift to section 302A.241, which states that all 
requirements under section 302A.251 pertain to committee 
members,224  including SLCs.225
 
the evidence before rejecting it."). 
  True, the statute does not expressly 
 219. Their credentials are strongly established.  See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ 
I.D. 
 220. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 1 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 221. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 550. 
 222. See § 302A.251, subdiv. 1; see also supra note 27. 
 223. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 7 (2008).   
 224. See id. (stating committee members are “directors” for purposes of section 
302A.251). 
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require SLCs to make reasonable decisions.226  Fundamentally, 
however, the plain meaning stems from the context of the statute 
as a whole, not solely the technical choice of words in a single 
provision.227
Overall, the Minnesota statutes require courts to review the 
reasonableness of SLC decisions just as they should review decisions 
of other committees or decisions of the board itself.
   
228  It seems 
unlikely that the legislature would wish SLCs to substitute their own 
personal preferences and opinions for the minimum standards of 
reasonable decision-making because section 302A.241, subdivision 
6 articulates that neither the establishing of a committee nor acting 
as the committee relieves directors of liability from the duty of care 
in section 302A.251, subdivision 1.229
Corporations favor the use of SLCs when corporate directors, 
by reason of conflicts of interest, may not be trusted to serve the 
corporation’s best interests.
   
230  Given the SLC’s purpose and 
function, its decision should reasonably serve these interests in the 
same way a corporate director, if not conflicted, would serve 
them.231
 
 225. See § 302A.241, subdiv. 1 (“Committees may include a special litigation 
committee . . . .”). 
  Because the UnitedHealth standard prevents courts from 
 226. See § 302A.251, subdiv. 1.  But cf. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 559 
(applying section 302A.251, subdivision 1 to SLCs to support its holding that SLCs 
be independent and act in good faith).  The majority in UnitedHealth relied on an 
article that asserted the difference between the business judgment rule and the 
business judgment doctrine; the former pertains to the protection of directors 
who make reasonable business decisions and the latter protects the decisions 
themselves.  Id. at 551 n.6 (citing Joseph Hinsey IV, Business Judgment and the 
American Law Institute’s Corporate Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine, and the 
Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 611–12 (1984)).  Nonetheless, the article notes 
that “the essential elements of the doctrine and the rule are the same.”  Hinsey, 
supra at 612.  Later in its opinion, the UnitedHealth court renames its application of 
the business judgment rule as the “business judgment liability rule” for the sake of 
distinguishing it from section 302A.251, subdivision 1 and excluding the 
reasonableness requirement.  See In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 553 n.8. 
 227. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2004); Mavco, Inc. v. Eggink, 739 N.W.2d 148, 
153 (Minn. 2007). 
 228. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 7 (2008) (stating committee members 
are deemed directors for purposes of section 302A.251); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, 
subdiv. 1 (2008) (requiring directors to act reasonably). 
 229. See § 302A.241, subdiv. 6.  
 230. See Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance, the Role of Special Litigation 
Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 84–87 (1993). 
 231. Section 302A.241 likewise imposes the same requirements on committees 
regarding the procedures as those that are imposed on corporate directors.  See 
§ 302A.241, subdiv. 4.   
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assessing the reasoning behind SLC conclusions, section 302A.251 
is significantly deprived of its intended effect.232
B. Structural Bias and the Problems with Tainted Boards Selecting the 
SLCs 
  
When demand is excused, courts may not trust defendant 
directors; yet, to manage the resulting lawsuit impartially, 
Minnesota statutes permit the same group of directors to appoint 
individuals who will handle the same task.233  Such is the situation 
even when corporate directors face serious claims of self-dealing.234
Historically, SLCs have nearly always settled or dismissed 
derivative suits.
  
By networking, directors can potentially “shop” for SLC members 
whom they believe will decide the outcome in their favor.  
235  This trend is consistent with the potential for 
structural bias in the selection of SLC members.  “Structural bias” 
has been described as occurring when “the judgment of seemingly 
disinterested directors—who are not defendants in a litigation or 
participants in a wrongdoing alleged in a litigation—is inherently 
corrupted by the ‘common cultural bond’ and ‘natural empathy 
and collegiality’ shared by most directors.”236
The UnitedHealth majority noted that the federal district court 
would decide whether the SLC was independent, yet suggested that 
appropriate factors to consider in making this decision included 
(1) any possible interest the SLC members might have in the 
litigation;
   
237
 
 232. See infra Part VI. 
 (2) their affiliations through prior business dealings or 
 233. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 1. 
 234. See Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210–11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) 
(stating that directors have a “fundamental responsibility and authority for 
corporate management”). 
 235. See id. at 210 (recognizing the inherent risk that committee members will 
always be hesitant to recommend litigation); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that 
Isn’t a Rule—the Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 641–42 (2002).  See 
also George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The 
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 96, 105–09 (1980) (arguing that the 
use of special litigation committees may effectively prevent derivative suits in most 
cases). 
 236. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1765 (citing James D. Cox, Searching for 
the Corporation’s Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI 
Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959, 962, 1008 (1982)). 
 237. This includes: 
(1) whether the members are defendants in the litigation; (2) whether 
the members are exposed to direct and substantial liability; (3) whether 
the “members are outside, non-management directors”; (4) whether the 
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relationships; (3) whether the SLC members received advice from 
counsel or “other independent advisors”; (4) the severity of the 
alleged conduct; and (5) the size of the SLC.238
In response to the concerns over structural bias, the 
UnitedHealth majority argued that SLC members are discouraged 
from making biased decisions because SLC members empathize 
with the well being of the corporation;
  
239 their concern for their 
own reputation overrides any urge to make unreasonable decisions 
for the sake of the directors;240 and they are far enough outside the 
corporate ranks for any empathy they might have for the directors 
to actually affect their decisions.241
But whether this test truly ensures independence may depend 
on how structural bias can affect SLC decision making.  Thus, 
before analyzing the independence test in UnitedHealth, the reader 
should understand the two pertinent psychological aspects of 
structural bias: in-group association and cultural similarity.  
  
1. In-Group Bias 
James Cox and Harry Munsinger published an article on 
structural bias,242 in which they examined the Robbers’ Cave 
experiment.243  This study involved two groups of young men at a 
summer camp.244  The experimenters assigned each group different 
camping tasks.245
 
members were on the board when the alleged wrongdoing occurred; 
[and] (5) whether the “members participated in the alleged 
wrongdoing[.]”   
  After the tasks were completed, the 
experimenters held competitions between these two groups and 
In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 560 
n.11 (Minn. 2008) (quoting 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1746–53).  
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 558. 
 240. Id.  
 241. Id.  Notably, the members comprising the SLC in UnitedHealth were 
former members of the Minnesota Supreme Court.  Id. at 548.  Even if this were to 
make one feel a greater sense of trust in the SLC’s recommendation, not all SLCs 
have former justices since Minnesota statutes do not require SLC members to have 
judicial experience.  See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subdiv. 2 (2008) (requiring only 
that committee members be “natural persons”). 
 242. James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological 
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
83 (1985). 
 243. Id. at 100–01. 
 244. Id. at 100. 
 245. Id.  
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discovered, as a result of their in-group chemistry, both groups 
became increasingly hostile towards one another.246  They later 
merged the two groups and assigned tasks that required 
cooperative efforts.247  As a result both groups then interacted more 
positively.248  Despite popular assumptions, the competitions did not 
primarily cause hostility.249  Shortly after the experimenters 
separated the groups, and prior to the competitions, both groups 
jeered at one another, signifying that the separate grouping 
created negative tension between both groups.250
Although camping activities and corporate governance 
constitute significantly different activities, they can induce the same 
psychological force: in-group bias.
   
251  The age difference between 
the campers and corporate directors doesn’t change this; Cox and 
Munsinger referred to another study where experimenters gave two 
groups options to distribute monetary rewards and penalties to in-
group members, members from the other group, or both.252  Each 
group not only preferred awarding benefits to in-group members, 
they “[maximized] the difference between their own group and the 
other group, even though that strategy caused them to forsake a profit 
maximizing option for their ingroup.”253
In-group bias occurs because people value the sense of 
belonging.
 
254  Likewise, SLC members value being selected to 
handle derivative suits.255  Because they were selected by directors, 
they may associate this value with the directors.256  Consequently, 
they and the directors may become one group, separating 
derivative or class action plaintiffs into an outside group.257
 
 246. Id.  
  Given 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id.  
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 101. 
 253. Id. (second emphasis added). 
 254. “[I]ndividuals associate and maintain their membership in groups that 
make a positive contribution toward their social identity, from which they derive 
emotional or value significance.  A further benefit derived from membership in a 
group is its contributions to the members’ sense of self-worth.”  Id. at 102. 
 255. “As seen earlier, individuals place great value on their selection to and 
membership on a corporation’s board: They are attracted to their colleagues and 
value greatly the associations they reap from the directorship.”  Id. at 104 
(referring specifically to SLC members in the context of derivative suits). 
 256. Id.  
 257. Id. 
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this rivalry, the reader may guess why SLCs persistently recommend 
dismissal of derivative suits.  
2. Cultural Bias 
While most SLCs do not purposefully favor the directors’ 
interests to the corporation’s detriment, their association with the 
board causes them to agree with the directors, even in good faith, 
over which action best serves the corporation’s interests.258  
However, in-group bias alone does not cause this trend.  
Friendships between directors grow during their tenures and thus 
become the source of income and prestige many directors need.259  
SLC members who are selected tend to be individuals with whom 
the board has shared experiences, whether through business 
transactions, business backgrounds, social gatherings, or common 
acquaintances.260  Due to these circumstances, the duty of making a 
judgment regarding the board members tends to exacerbate the in-
group favoritism.261  As a result, the SLC members and defendants 
may develop a common perspective vis-à-vis plaintiffs, which then 
causes SLCs to favor the defendants despite possible contrary 
indications.262
The UnitedHealth court recognized friendships as one of 
several considerations to use in determining an SLC’s 
independence, but this standard is often too intangible to apply.
 
263  
From a policy standpoint, precluding SLC independence on the 
grounds of close friendships would render SLCs useless because 
most corporate executives have already been acquainted with 
individuals from similar backgrounds.264
 
 258. See supra Part V.B. 
  Moreover, cultural bias 
does not depend on established friendships to affect an SLC 
 259. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 242, at 104. 
 260. Id. at 107. 
 261. Id. 
 262.  Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 821, 859 n.158 (2004) (citing a number of reports on the effects 
friendships have on the investigatory process, including Donald C. Langevoort, 
Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 71, 86 (2002); Linda R. Meyer, Forgiveness and Public Trust, 27 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1515, 1537 (2000)). 
 263. Velasco, supra note 262, at 843. 
 264. See Velasco, supra note 262, at 859 (quoting Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 
1040, 1051–52 (Del. 2004) (asserting that prior business acquaintances coupled 
with the attendance of multiple social events was not enough to “rebut the 
presumption of independence.”)).   
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member’s perspective; the sharing of a common background 
increases mutual attraction and consequently ethnocentrism.265  
The cultural bonds, sense of association, and complexity of shared 
tasks exert extra psychological force when occurring together 
within an SLC member.266
3. The UnitedHealth Standard Underestimates Structural Bias 
 
As shown earlier, structural bias can impact decision making to 
a significant degree, which explains the likely reasons for an SLC’s 
common tendency to dismiss a derivative suit.  While the 
UnitedHealth factors provide a detailed disclosure of an SLC 
member’s history with the company, structural bias cannot be 
remedied by background checks.267  In-group bias and cultural bias 
can exist without prior business dealings, material interests in the 
suit, or interactions with board members because they stem from 
the selection process.268  These biases exist in groups of all sizes and 
impact decision making regardless of the severity of the alleged 
conduct.269
The court’s generalizations about the SLC’s incentives to resist 
their personal biases may overlook two realities behind the SLC’s 
decision making process.  First, an SLC member’s empathy for a 
corporation is no stronger than that of the director, yet the latter 
has never discouraged directors from committing misconduct.
  Of course, the UnitedHealth factors remain important 
for consideration, but do not, by themselves, establish that SLCs are 
truly independent.   
270
 
 265. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 
  
242, at 105. 
 266. See id. at 104 (“This synergism creates compelling psychological forces 
toward ingroup biases within the . . . special litigation committee.”). 
 267. But even then, establishing these factors typically does not disqualify the 
board.  If some factors are shown to exist, as long as an SLC member did not 
participate in the alleged misconduct, courts are commonly hesitant to question 
the independence of the SLC.  See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1755.  One 
court even acknowledged that “[b]usiness dealings seldom take place between 
complete strangers and it would be a strained and artificial rule which required a 
director to be unacquainted or uninvolved with fellow directors in order to be 
regarded as independent.”  Id. (quoting In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 852 F. Supp. 1437, 
1442 (N.D. Cal 1993)).  
 268. See Cox & Munsinger, supra note 242, at 104. 
 269. See id.   
 270. Dr. McGuire is our case in point.  Prior to the backdating scheme, he 
served UHG as its director for seventeen years, fifteen of which he spent as the 
chair.  See SLC Report, supra note 9, at 7.  He was furthermore accredited for 
helping “the Company’s revenues [grow] from approximately $600 million to 
more than $70 billion, with an average annual return to shareholders of nearly 30 
3. Hogg-Triggs.docx 11/18/2009  1:29 PM 
108 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1 
Second, SLC members are not as distant from the corporate ranks 
as the majority presumes.  As shown above, from the moment they 
are selected, SLC members may feel a sense of association, which 
can seriously impact their decisions.271
On the other hand, the Zapata standard provides an 
opportunity—not a requirement—for thorough judicial review.  
Under this standard, the court can examine findings, reasoning 
and conclusions, and thus, verify the true independence of the SLC 
members in the processes they used and applied.
  Because the UnitedHealth 
standard precludes courts from reviewing the findings and reasons 
behind the SLC’s recommendations, the reasoning and motives of 
these committee members may not be disclosed, not even in cases 
where the facts could materially contradict the rationale behind 
their recommendations.  
272
C.  Difficulties in Confirming Good Faith and Adequacy 
  Surely, a 
plaintiff who established that the complaint was well-pleaded or 
that the lawsuit should be certified as a class action should be 
entitled to no less.  
The problem resulting from structural bias is worsened by the 
fact that the standard adopted by the court prevents judges from 
testing the “honesty” of the SLC’s investigation.  None can refute 
the principle that the final conclusions of an SLC should be based 
on the facts.  Good faith, after all, means “honesty in fact.”273  The 
SLC’s duty to make well-informed decisions means that its decision 
should be based on findings.274  By issuing their report, the SLC 
members represent to the court that they base their 
recommendations on what they discovered in the investigation.275
 
percent.”  Id.  
  
 271. See supra notes 254–255 and accompanying text.   
 272. There have been cases where SLC members’ independence was refuted 
by the substance of their findings.  See, e.g., Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 
348, 350–51, 354 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d, 714 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1983).  The court 
found that regardless of whether the SLC conducted a procedurally adequate 
investigation, their conclusions and recommendations were not reasonably 
supported by the facts.  Id. at 354. 
 273. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011, subdiv. 13 (2006). 
 274. See In re UnitedHealth, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 
551 (Minn. 2008). 
 275. In every conclusion, the UHG SLC begins by saying “[i]n light of the 
many factors it considered . . .” and “[i]n light of these considerations . . .” and 
“critical to its consideration was the lack of evidence supporting the pursuit of 
these claims . . . .”  See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ IV.A–F.  These are all assertions 
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Yet, the Auerbach standard contains no mechanism for verifying, if 
necessary, that this representation is true.276
Thus, in the UHG SLC report, the SLC members listed the 
pertinent laws and thoroughly explained their procedures.
   
277  
However, as Judge Rosenbaum pointed out, they did not provide 
factual findings and analysis in a manner that would explain and 
justify their recommendations.278
The Zapata standard fixes this problem.  Delaware requires 
plaintiffs who challenge the independence of SLCs to show that the 
committee members “based [their] conclusions . . . on . . . outside 
influences rather than the merits of the issues.”
  Omitting substantive support 
does not demonstrate bad faith, yet, it inhibits the court from 
ensuring the SLC investigated and managed the derivative suit in 
good faith.  
279  Upon a proper 
showing, the court reviews the substance of the SLC findings to 
determine whether the SLC conducted its investigation without any 
extraneous influence.280
VI. DEBATABLE CRITICISM: A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
ZAPATA STANDARD 
  Requiring substantive support for their 
conclusions and recommendations ensures that SLC directors 
actually base their decisions on the merits of the case.   
The UnitedHealth court rejected the Zapata standard for seven 
reasons,281
 
to the court that the SLC based its recommendations on the facts discovered from 
the investigation.  See id.  
 but none of these policy justifications obviate the need 
to scrutinize SLC decisions to the extent discretionally permitted by 
Zapata. 
 276. The question of adequacy “is solely how appropriately to set about to 
gather the pertinent data.”  Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 634 (1979) 
(emphasis added).  The court went on to say that “[w]hat has been uncovered and 
the relative weight accorded in evaluating and balancing the several factors and 
considerations are beyond the scope of judicial concern.”  Id. 
 277. See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ II–III. 
 278. Id.  Without providing any factual support, they based their 
recommendations on conclusions that only “some of the claims against Dr. 
McGuire may have merit” or that some defenses “might be available to him.”  Id. 
at 59. 
 279. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1755 (quoting Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 
1184, 1190 (Del. 1985)). 
 280. Id. 
 281. See In re UnitedHealth, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 
556–58 (Minn. 2008). 
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The court’s first argument, that judges are unqualified282 to 
evaluate business judgments, departs from established business-
judgment-rule law and undervalues the fact that an SLC report is 
(or should be) a combination of a recital of processes used, 
findings made, and reasoned conclusions.283  The court’s second 
concern emphasized the complexity of second-guessing SLC 
decisions; however, judicial review does not have to involve 
investigation or second-guessing of the business judgment exercised 
by the SLC.284  What should be reviewed is the process used and an 
assurance that it was not tainted by arbitrary behavior.  The fact 
remains that in most derivative cases, shareholders accuse directors 
of disloyalty.  Judges undisputedly are the experts in this issue 
because it stems from the legal nature of one’s conduct, not from 
complex balancing of business interests.285
The court’s third argument—that SLC directors need to be 
able to prevent litigation when they believe it would do more harm 
than good
  
286—is true, but arguably not to the point.  Nowhere in 
the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion did the Zapata majority 
suggest that courts must review all derivative suits.287  If the SLC 
genuinely finds the claims to be meritless or the litigation costs to 
be prohibitive, it can easily persuade judges with its substantive 
findings of fact and reasoning.  Zapata even stressed that a court 
“must carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate 
interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit.”288  
The Zapata standard encourages judges to consider corporate 
interests just as strongly as does the Auerbach approach.289  The 
UnitedHealth court’s opinion may overlook the fact that the 
Auerbach standard can be especially troublesome in the context of 
suits affecting small corporations in that it undermines the 
opportunity of judicial review for arbitrary decision making.290
 
 282. Id. at 556. 
 
 283. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 1980). 
 284. See In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 556, 566 n.8 (Anderson, J., 
concurring).  
 285. Cf. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789 n.18 (stating that courts, not litigants, 
decide the merits of litigation).  
 286. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 556–57. 
 287. See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d 779.  Even in Delaware, SLC decisions to dismiss 
derivative suits are rarely overturned.  See also infra note 293. 
 288. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1980) (emphasis added). 
 289. There have been no signs of widespread arbitrary disagreements leading 
courts to overturn SLC conclusions.  See infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
 290. The ALI has suggested that because a small corporation is less separated 
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The UnitedHealth court’s fourth and fifth reasons, that Zapata 
would waste judicial resources291 and undermine the corporate 
autonomy needed to prevent strike suits,292 simply presume that the 
Zapata standard creates an express lane for shareholders with 
meritless claims.  Both arguments overlook the fact that Delaware 
courts rarely dismiss SLC decisions for lack of reasonable basis293 
because the Delaware pleading standards require shareholders to 
allege the facts needed to justify a “reasonable doubt” that the SLC 
action is protected by the business judgment rule.294  More 
importantly, the shareholders must allege such facts “with 
particularity.”295  This requirement means that courts will not 
overturn an SLC motion to dismiss a derivative suit every time the 
plaintiffs generally assert that the SLC’s report or investigation was 
negligently or dishonestly conducted.296  Hence, they still grant SLC 
decision-making the very strong benefit of the doubt.297
The sixth concern for the UnitedHealth court was that, “[A] 
court applying its ‘business judgment’ is prone to act on its own 
biases and predilections. Ironically, then, Zapata simply replaces 
the danger of bias on the part of the corporate directors and the 
SLC with the danger of bias on the part of the court.”
 
298
 
from its shareholders, a compelled termination of a derivative suit by a separate 
committee would be less appropriate.  See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 
7.01 cmt. e, at 21 (1992).  The policy reasons justifying derivative actions are “not 
always applicable to the closely held corporation.”  Id.  Moreover, corporate 
boards are less likely to be disinterested in smaller firms because “the majority 
stockholders are likely also to be the firm’s managers.”  Id.  
  This 
argument appears to discount or ignore the expertise of courts in 
reviewing fairness and adequacy of process in contexts where the 
courts have no specific background in or knowledge of the 
 291. See In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 557. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See, e.g., Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 75 
(Del. 1997); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Del. 1985); Carlton Invs. v. 
TLC Beatrice Int’l Holdings, Inc., 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1165, 1173 (1997). 
 294. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1614 (quoting Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 
194, 210 (Del. 1991) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808 (Del. 1984))). 
 295. 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 33, at 1614. 
 296. See id.; see also Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788–89 (Del. 
1981) (stating that if the SLC shows that its investigation was reasonable, 
independent, and in good faith, the court may dismiss the derivative suit on the 
derivative plaintiff’s motion). 
 297. See In re UnitedHealth Group Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 
544, 551 (Minn. 2008) (stating that a court will defer to the decision of an SLC 
where the board properly delegates its authority to act to the SLC). 
 298. Id. at 557. 
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particular subject matter involved.  Under the Minnesota Rules of 
Evidence, for example, a court may require a medical expert to 
provide a factual basis underlying his or her ultimate opinions even 
though the court itself is not equally qualified in the field of 
medicine.299
Finally, the court characterizes Zapata’s allowance for judges to 
consider public policy as “troubling,” in that it “compels a party to 
proceed with litigation because some greater public good, as 
determined by a court that will not have to live with the 
consequences of the decision, might result.”
   
300  Simply put, the 
UnitedHealth court assumes that Zapata will allow courts to prioritize 
public policy over corporate interests.301  This assumption is 
overstated and perhaps takes the Zapata language out of context.  
The Zapata opinion stated that public policy “when appropriate” 
would be considered “in addition to the corporation’s best 
interests,” not in place of those interests.302  In other words, the 
Zapata decision encourages courts to sometimes consider public 
policy factors, such as due process, but not to render decisions that 
serve the public at the expense of the corporation.303
All seven of the Court’s policy arguments center on important 
considerations, yet none of them seem to deal adequately with 
balancing the risks of failing to detect arbitrary or worse actions by 
an SLC.  The outstanding credentials and experience of the two 
SLC members involved in the UnitedHealth case may have distracted 
the Court’s attention from the kinds of situations that, in the 
future, will be reviewed under the instructions of its opinion. 
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
UnitedHealth undoubtedly resulted in a sound decision and 
disposition of the litigation involved in that case.  The credentials 
 
 299. See MINN. R. EVID. 703 (the facts which the expert relies upon must either 
be admissible or reasonably relied upon); see also MINN. R. EVID. 705 (the court may 
require an expert to disclose the facts underlying his or her conclusions).   
 300. In re UnitedHealth, 754 N.W.2d at 558 (emphasis added). 
 301. See id. 
 302. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
 303. Most importantly, the Zapata method of public policy considerations is 
supported by the Minnesota statutes, which provide that “[i]n discharging the 
duties of the position of director, a director may . . . consider . . . community and 
societal considerations . . . .”  MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subdiv. 5 (2008).   
3. Hogg-Triggs.docx 11/18/2009  1:29 PM 
2009] WELL-PLEAD DERIVATIVE LAWSUITS 113 
and expertise of the SLC were impeccable.304  Judge Rosenbaum 
appears to have accepted that decision and applied it in granting 
approval to the settlement as arranged by the SLC.305  Whether, as 
Judge Rosenbaum questioned earlier, the former CEO should be 
permitted to retain (according to the Judge) “pelf” in the amount 
of $800 million,306 and whether any responsibility of the former 
chair of the UHG Compensation Committee, who was apparently 
involved in at least part of the options issues,307
If the reader takes two steps back from the decisions, however, 
several facts become clear.  UHG paid $895 million to settle the 
class action, with up to $64 million in legal fees;
 should be tied to an 
arbitration to determine the value a lawsuit against him might have, 
are interesting questions.  It seems appropriate to respect the SLC 
determination that “enough was enough” and that reasonable 
justice had been or would be done.   
308 UHG agreed to 
an SEC-imposed injunction (without admitting liability), 
prohibiting future violations of the federal securities laws in several 
specific ways;309 the SLC extracted additional recoveries of 
substantial value from the former CEO and the former general 
counsel, both of whom had been enjoined by the SEC from 
denying that they violated the federal securities laws;310 and UHG 
was forced to restate its financials for a period of several prior years 
due to the overstatement of income and the understatement of 
expense associated with the options backdating.311
Do these facts raise a possible inference that the UHG board 
failed to exercise its oversight responsibilities in an adequate 
manner?  Did any members of the board, other than the former 
CEO, the former Chairman of the Compensation Committee, and 
  
 
 304. The report provides irrefutable credentials of both former Minnesota 
Supreme Court Justices.  See SLC Report, supra note 9, ¶ I.D. 
 305. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 631 F. 
Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Minn. 2009). 
 306. In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., Nos. 06-CV-
1216, 06-CV-1692, 2007 WL 4571127, at *6 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 307. He did resign following issuance of the Wilmer Cutler report.  See Wilmer 
Cutler Report, supra note 140.  
 308. See STANFORD REPORT, supra note 3.  
 309. Id. (Under the terms of a proposed settlement agreement, UHG paid 
$895 million into a settlement fund for the benefit of class members; UHG will 
also supplement the changes already implemented in its corporate governance 
policies.). 
 310. See SLC Report, supra note 9.  
 311. See id. at 31. 
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former General Counsel, face any repercussions?  Were the monies 
paid out by UHG covered by insurance?  If the value of the lawsuit 
against the former chair of the Compensation Committee had 
substantial value in the SLC-negotiated binding arbitration, were 
that person’s legal costs, if any, covered by indemnification by 
UHG and thus by the shareholders?  Did anyone on the board, 
other than the former CEO, suffer any financial consequences as a 
result of these “troubles”?  Were members of the board 
responsible?  Were they entitled to rely on representations and 
reports of the former CEO and other officials? 
None of these questions appear to have been answered in any 
public forum—they have been disposed of by the SLC decision to 
dismiss all of the derivative cases312 and the presumptive acceptance 
of the settlement by the class action plaintiffs.313
UHG’s option “troubles” are now apparently near an end.  But 
the real significance of the UnitedHealth case will be found in the 
way in which it is applied to similar upcoming corporate situations.  
Here, the future is troubling.  
  Given the 
decisions of the SLC, what can be said of the accountability, if any, 
of members of a board of directors?  Has anyone asked whether it 
might be appropriate to seek recovery of director’s fees and stock 
options from any director who shares responsibility for this fiasco?  
The Minnesota Supreme Court has established that the 
corporation making use of an SLC to manage or dismiss derivative 
suits has the burden of proving (1) that the members appointed to 
serve on the SLC are disinterested, (2) that the procedures they 
used were reasonable and (3) that they acted in good faith.314
These possible consequences of the UnitedHealth standard 
potentially reflect an impediment to holding directors accountable 
for their misconduct.  Despite the exceptional credibility and 
  As 
shown above, courts cannot effectively verify good faith or 
disinterestedness without first seeing how the procedures support 
an SLC’s conclusions.  Because neither findings of fact nor 
reasoned conclusions can now be required nor reviewed by a court, 
Minnesota courts, and federal courts exercising diversity 
jurisdiction where Minnesota law applies, are essentially restrained 
from verifying either disinterestedness or good faith. 
 
 312. SLC Report, supra note 9. 
 313. See 10Q Report, supra note 13. 
 314. See In re UnitedHealth Group, Inc., S’holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 
544, 559 (Minn. 2008). 
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credentials of the SLC members in UnitedHealth, we might see 
problems in the future in which SLC members, who possess 
substantially less credentials or credibility than the two incumbents 
in this case, can help directors avoid accountability by producing a 
report which proposes dismissal of pending lawsuits without 
showing any findings of fact or reasons for the decision. 
In light of this situation, there are two possible ways in which 
the State could improve review of future SLC reports.  The first is 
for new legislation to require courts to follow the Delaware Zapata 
standard in the future.  After all, the UnitedHealth decision is no 
more than an interpretation of Minnesota Statutes sections 
302A.251 and 302A.241.315  The second is for courts to press for 
detailed information to support the corporation’s burden of proof 
that the SLC in question “utilized appropriate investigative 
procedures and methodologies and pursued its investigation in 
good faith.”316
 
 315. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.251, 302A.241 (2006).  
  By enabling courts to verify how the SLCs’ 
recommendations stem from proper procedures and 
methodologies, these implementations could ensure that director 
accountability is not dissipated by use of SLC investigations and 
reports. 
 316. See id. at 555. 
